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Abstract This paper reports the main ﬁndings of an evaluation of an intensive four-week policing
operation along a single bus corridor, aimed at reducing the extent of crime along the bus route.
The evaluation, which adopts a mixture of quantitative evaluation techniques, demonstrates that
the operation was successful both in increasing ofﬁcer arrest rates (up to four times for the ofﬁcers
who worked on the scheme), and also in reducing crime levels for particular crime types, namely
assault and theft from vehicle, up to 400m from the route. A conceptual discussion is provided as
to how to measure the effectiveness of an operation with no geographically predeﬁned action area
and to deﬁne the relationship between action areas and displacement or diffusion zones.
Consequently, this evaluation examines both the inﬂuence of the scheme within a predeﬁned
distance from the route, andalso proposes a method fordetermining the likely rangeof inﬂuence of
the scheme in terms of physical distance.
Introduction
A substantial body of research has contributed to understanding of what works in
crime prevention (for reviews see Sherman et al., 1998; Visher and Weisburd, 1998).
However, there is a paucity of research concerned with “what works” in reducing crime
along public transport corridors (local transit service routes). Consequently, this article
presents the main ﬁndings of an evaluation of a police operation that aimed to reduce
crime and disorder along a single bus corridor.
To provide a context for the forthcoming analyses, we begin by considering the
signiﬁcance of crime and disorder on bus routes, and examine the potential measures
available for their reduction. We then discuss the need for evaluations of these kinds of
preventative measures both to determine the relative successes and or failures of the
schemes, and to inform future measures and disseminate best practice.
An overview of crime and disorder on public transport (public transit)
Fear of crime on public transport is a possible limiting factor to public transport usage,
and in the UK the then DETR (1998) suggested passenger levels could be increased by
3 per cent at peak and 10 per cent at off peak times if such fears were addressed.
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tackle the actual level of crime and disorder, indeed “the ultimate goal should be to
make riders feel safe by ensuring that they are safe” (Nelson, 1997). However, it is
difﬁcult to gauge the level and extent of crime and disorder that occurs on public
transport for a number of reasons, primarily because public transport agencies do not
collect information on such incidents in a systematic or standardised format (Easteal
and Wilson, 1991). In the UK, this problem is compounded on buses because the police
do not record crime incidents on the bus as a speciﬁc category of crime incident, there
is no dedicated transit police force, and bus operators outside of London have no
statutory requirement to report incidents (DTLR, 2002). Furthermore, it is problematic
to give a meaningful static location for a crime committed on a moving bus. Hence, it is
extremely difﬁcult to determine the amount of crime that physically occurs on public
transport from police recorded incidents. However it is possible to determine the
amount of crime that occurs along an individual bus corridor, rather than on the bus
itself, using police recorded incidents, as will be demonstrated later. This is important
when considering the holistic approach to the public transport journey (DETR, 1999)
whereby safety on the public transport journey should be seen in the context of the
whole journey. This incorporates not only travelling on the bus, but also waiting at
stops and walking to, from or between stops.
In addition to this, the extent of under-reporting of incidents of bus crime is also
unknown. Findings from a survey conducted by Levine et al. (1986) in Los Angeles
suggest that there are 25-30 times more bus crime incidents than are reported. In
England and Wales, the British Crime Survey (BCS) is often used to estimate the
amount of under-reporting of crime. In an analysis of the BCS, Mirlees-Black et al.
(1998) found that only 44 per cent of crime incidents were reported to the police and this
varied by crime type (57 per cent robbery, 43 per cent thefts from vehicle, 26 per cent
incidents of vandalism). It is unclear how this ﬁgure relates to bus crime because the
survey does not support a breakdown by mode of transport (by bus or by train for
example).
It is also suggested (DTLR, 2002) that there is a signiﬁcant difference between the
perceived, and actual levels of crime and disorder on public transport. An alternative
measure of the extent of crime on busesmay be derived through surveys of passengers.
To illustrate such ﬁndings, a recent UK survey of bus passengers found the following:
16 per cent of passengers experienced and 29 per cent observed verbal abuse, 28 per
cent experienced and 20 per cent observed objects thrown at a bus, 2 per cent
experienced and 6 per cent observed assault, and, 3 per cent experienced and 3 per cent
observed theft/muggings (Baker and Bewick, 2001).
It is obviously difﬁcult to tackle problems of crime and disorder along bus routes
(and consequently to reassure the public about the safety of using buses) when the
extent of crime either on the buses or along bus routes is not fully known.
Crime prevention measures
In relation to crime prevention in general, according to routine activities theory (Cohen
and Felson, 1979), for crimes to occur the following must converge in space and time: a
motivated offender, the absence of capable guardians against crime and the
opportunity to commit crime. Capable guardians are not restricted to police ofﬁcers or
security guards but include anyone whose presence or proximity discourages a crime
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present at a given place and time serve as guardians against crime.
Opportunities for crime vary over time and space, as does the presence of offenders.
Consequently, different solutions may be required in different areas and environments.
Nevertheless, policies aimed at preventing and reducing crime generally do so by
exerting inﬂuence over one or more of the three routine activity theory elements. For
example, one approach to affect change would be to improve surveillance and by
helping to ensure that sufﬁcient “guardians” are present at speciﬁc times of the day to
make it more difﬁcult for a motivated offender to target a suitable victim, perpetrate a
crime (e.g. robbery, theft, assault) and make an escape. Similarly, CCTV schemes, and
in particular those that initiate some form of law enforcement response (where
appropriate) may increase guardianship. A further approach is to reduce the
vulnerability of potential victims, and hence opportunities for crime, by protecting
them from motivated offenders. For instance, a number of studies have demonstrated
that so called “target hardening” schemes, which involve the installation of new
door/window locks and other physical security measures, are effective in reducing the
risk of burglary (e.g. Anderson et al., 1995; Johnson et al., 2001; Bowers et al., 2003).
A diverse range of potential preventative measures that could be implemented to
tackle crime and disorder on public transport systems exist. Examples include
improving visibility or lighting, increasing staff presence, allowing police in uniform to
travel on buses for free, the use of CCTV, emergency help points, cleaning and regular
maintenance, and the use of transport wardens. Useful overviews and examples of
such schemes are reported in detail elsewhere (e.g. Atkins, 1990; Felson et al., 1996;
Eck, 1997; Needle and Cobb, 1997; Smith and Clarke, 2000; DTLR, 2002). One ﬁnding
that has emerged is that the most successful schemes tend to be those which are
multi-agency and that adopt multi-tactical approaches.
However, perhaps the biggest limitation of many previous schemes aimed at
reducing crime on public transport is that interventions have been applied on an ad hoc
basis or as a response to funding opportunities, rather than as a result of the precise
a-priori matching of a speciﬁc solution to a speciﬁc problem. As Easteal and Wilson
(1991, p. 12) observe “the ﬁrst task of any crime prevention measure must be to analyse
existing data to establish incidence patterns including type of crime, location, time and
other relevant environmental factors”, and that transit agencies “often fail to conduct
victimisation or pattern analysis studies to determine the exact scope of their problems
before they implement remedial measures”. This in part may be explained by the
difﬁculties involved in measuring the extent of bus crime as previously highlighted.
Importantly, knowledge about the successes and failures of schemes implemented is
limited due to a lack of, or difﬁculties in, evaluation of the measures taken.
Nevertheless, some evaluations have been conducted (Van Andel, 1989; Laycock and
Webb, 1992; Carr and Spring, 1993; Poyner, 1993; Felson et al., 1996; and La Vigne,
1997). Although these evaluations demonstrate successes achieved in crime prevention
on public transport, there are inherent methodological difﬁculties in determining the
effectiveness of these measures (Eck, 1997). On a transport system there are a number
of inter-connected settings that make it difﬁcult to identify appropriate comparison
areas, and there also are a variety of potential victims (staff, passengers and facilities).
More generally, it is evident that there is a paucity of evaluation research concerned
with interventions aimed at reducing crime and disorder on public transport systems
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evaluations of this type of scheme.
In the current paper we will adapt a number of quantitative evaluation techniques
that have been used more generally in the ﬁeld of crime prevention. In particular,
Shermanetal.(1998) haverecentlyemphasisedtheneed touserobust evaluationdesigns
that, as a minimum, consider changes in an action area relative to a suitable comparison
orreference area.Evaluationsthatconsiderchangesinan actionareaover timealonefail
to account for what would have happened in the absence of a particular scheme,
commonlyreferredtoasthecounterfactual.Thus,foreachoftheanalysespresentedhere
it was important to identify an appropriate comparison or reference area (or group), a
task that was aided by the use of a geographical information system (GIS).
Operation Bream: a safer travel initiative
Operation Bream was a high visibility intensive policing operation that took place
along a single bus corridor on Merseyside for a four-week period from the 22 April to
the 19 May 2002. This multi-agency operation involved the targeting of criminals both
on and around one bus route by a dedicated police team in conjunction with a boosted
revenue protection operation implemented by revenue protection ofﬁcers. Police
ofﬁcers from the Operational Support Unit were utilised and worked on their rest days
to ensure that the operation did not prevent ofﬁcers from performing their regular
duties, and hence did not hinder police resources. Additional support was provided by
trafﬁc wardens, MASS security ofﬁcers (a dedicated local rapid response security ﬁrm
for public transport) and high-tech on-bus CCTV. The operation was implemented on a
single bus corridor that, it was suggested, experienced a relatively high amount of
crime compared to other bus routes. This is subsequently referred to as the action route
and is shown in Figure 1.
This bus route traverses through two of the ﬁve districts of Merseyside, Liverpool
and Sefton. The 2001 Census of Population reveals Liverpool’s population in 2001 was
approximately 440,000 and Sefton, 280,000. The census also reveals that in Liverpool
48.3 per cent of houses are without a car or van and in Sefton this ﬁgure is 31 per cent
(compared to national average for England of 27 per cent), highlighting the importance
of bus use in the area. The route also traverses through a mixture of land use types,
from Liverpool City Centre, through Bootle Town Centre, to the more rural-urban
fringe area of Thornton.
Importantly, the operation itself attempted to reduce crime not only on buses, but
also along the actual bus corridor itself. Therefore the bus route was selected as the
unit of analysis for this evaluation.
During the police operation, ofﬁcers accompanied revenue protection inspectors on
buses. Back-up teams of six police ofﬁcers also provided support in a police vehicle.
The ofﬁcers used the bus as a means to patrol the bus corridor as opposed to doing it
on foot or in a police car. It is suggested that this is a fairly unique method of policing
the route and one that criminals would not expect. Therefore along the bus route there
was a mixture of policing including that done in vehicles, on foot, and “on bus” patrols.
Any previous police presence on the bus route (pre-scheme) was a result of routine
police activity that happened to occur along that bus route. Such activity was not
intended to tackle crime speciﬁcally along the route, but was rather a response to calls
for service in the area.
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area where it is intended to reduce crime. Unlike many crime reduction initiatives, such
as those aimed at preventing burglary, which generally have a deﬁned geographical
target area, it is difﬁcult to precisely deﬁne the target area that this operation was
designed to impact upon. For example, one could examine changes along the action
route itself, all crime within a certain distance of the action route, or all crime visible to
police ofﬁcers patrolling the route. This raises the conceptual issue of whether the
effect of the scheme should be measured in terms of a reduction in a speciﬁc target
area, or whether it would be more appropriate to test the distance over which the
scheme might feasibly have an impact. This issue is not easily answered and thus we
take a combined approach here.
Anecdotal evidence from a similar scheme implemented in London, Operation
Seneca, suggested that for this operation reductions in crime were realised up to
distance of 200m from the bus route. Thus, as a starting point, we examined changes
within 200m of the bus route. Additionally we considered changes across greater
distances of up to 500m away. As the majority of police resources dedicated to
Operation Bream were concentrated along the route itself, it seemed less plausible that
changes observed at distances greater than this could be reasonably attributed to the
scheme.
The aim of the initiative was essentially to “pilot” an approach to tackle crime and
disorder along the bus route. When undertaking an evaluation of an operation it is
important to examine both what the intended outcomes are, and the processes by
which they would, in all likelihood, be expected to be achieved (Weiss, 1998). As a
result, it is important not only to ask if the operation worked, but what made it work (or
fail). For the current initiative, there exist a number of potential mechanisms that might
affect a reduction in crime along the bus route, including the following:
(1) Intensive policing along the bus route may result in people noticing extra
policing, which in turn may impact upon offenders’ behaviour, since they may
avoid this route.
(2) Increased police presence may lead to the police observing more crime events. A
subsequent associated increase in arrest rates may consequently deter other
potential offenders from committing offences along or around the bus route.
(3) Another possibility is that the increased police presence along bus routes may
result in bus drivers becoming more vigilant, and informing the police more
regularly and rapidly of incidents. Given the limited window for intervention
associated with most crimes, this may enable the police to respond to and
prevent or detect more (serious) incidents.
The expected outcome of each of these possibilities, of course, would be a reduction in
crime and disorder along the bus route. Part of the research conducted was to identify
the most salient objectives of the scheme and to determine how effective the initiative
was in relation to each of these.
The primary objective of the scheme was to increase the number of capable
guardians within the target area. In addition to the high visibility policing along the
route, ofﬁcers were also accompanied by revenue protection ofﬁcers to assist them
in their duties, thereby increasing guardianship still further. Theoretically, this
should reduce the likelihood of offenders committing crimes within the area, and
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apprehended.
Previous research has demonstrated that the positive effects of police crackdowns
may continue after the termination of the operation, an effect that Sherman (1990)
refers to as residual deterrence. Thus, a second aim of the initiative was to see if there
was evidence of this phenomenon where reductions were observed.
A third objective of the operation was to see if, as an indirect result of the activity,
there was a reduction in crime in other areas in the near vicinity of the action route, a
so-called diffusion of beneﬁt (Miethe, 1991). This is said to have occurred when the
positive effects of a scheme extend beyond its operational boundary. For instance,
where offenders are deterred from committing crimes both within an action area and
immediately adjacent areas. However it is equally possible that the operation may
negatively affect patterns of offending in areas adjacent to the action route, for
instance, where offending behaviour is simply displaced to neighbouring areas (e.g.
Bowers and Johnson, 2003), or offenders deterred from committing one type of crime
simply commit other (replacement) crimes. Thus, if there was a reduction in crime, the
scheme may also cause geographical displacement, crime-switch displacement, or a
more desirable outcome such as a diffusion of beneﬁt.
As discussed above, in terms of this operation, for which there was no precise action
area, an important issue is whether it is appropriate to measure possible
displacement/diffusion of beneﬁt over space, or whether any changes in the spatial
distribution of crime should be conceptualised in terms of an action area effect. Thus,
should the impact of the operation be considered in terms of a “range of effect” rather
than in the more traditional way of considering changes in both the action and
surrounding areas. The main rationale for examining patterns in the surrounding
area(s) in other evaluations is to determine whether the effects of the scheme extend
beyond the operational boundary. In initiatives such as that evaluated here the
operational boundary is less clear as the precise area over which the police patrolled
may well have extended beyond the boundary of the bus route, depending upon
circumstances. Thus, in the absence of detailed data on the area covered it seems less
reasonable to think in terms of a distinct target area and displacement zone.
From the above discussion, a number of speciﬁc hypotheses were generated
regarding the potential impacts of the scheme. In particular, as part of the evaluation
we tested the extent to which, as a result of the intervention there was:
(1) an increase in arrest rates for ofﬁcers working on Operation Bream;
(2) a reduction in calls for police service along the action route;
(3) a decrease in recorded crime within and around the bus route; and
(4) evidence of a residual deterrence effect
In the sections that follow we discuss the methods used to explore each hypothesis and
present the results of the consequent analyses.
Methods and results
Changes in arrests rates
Different policing operations are likely to have varying effects on police arrests, but the
general aim is to increase the number made. It was not possible to examine the number
of successful prosecutions realised as a direct result of Operation Bream because of the
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there was no reason to suspect that arrests made as a result of the operation were less
(or more) likely to lead to successful prosecutions than other operations, the
examination of arrest rates was used as the critical measure of success here.
The effect of the initiative on ofﬁcer arrest rates could be assessed in a number of
ways. For instance, it is possible to compareofﬁcer’s arrest rates during the period they
worked on the initiative with either their arrest rates at an earlier time, or, with other
ofﬁcer’s arrest rates during the period the initiative took place. Here we use a
combination of these two approaches. This ensures two things. First, that the analyses
controlled for the individual differences that exist between police ofﬁcers that may
affect performance, such as levels of experience, motivation and other psychological
factors. Thus, by using the same ofﬁcers and comparing their performance at different
time periods we could be relatively certain that any changes in arrest rates could be
attributed to the initiative rather than individual differences. Second, by comparing the
change in arrest rates for those who participated in the operation with those who did
not, it was possible to control for potential seasonal patterns in arrest rates.
The 85 ofﬁcers who worked on the operation were identiﬁed and their arrest rates
calculated for the periods prior to and during implementation. Arrest data for one
complete month, March 2002 (data on arrests were only available for complete calendar
months), were utilised for the before period to ensure comparability with the (one
month) implementation period. Arrest rates were calculated by dividing the number of
arrests made by each ofﬁcer by the number of days worked. For the period of
implementation, the number of days worked on the operation and the associated
arrests made by each ofﬁcer were known. Unfortunately, for the historic period, data
on the number of days each ofﬁcer worked were unavailable, and hence estimates were
derived for the number of days each ofﬁcer worked, based on typical shift patterns. To
increase the sensitivity of the analysis high (assuming ofﬁcers worked 15 days per
month), medium (20 days) and low (25 days) estimates of the arrest rates were
produced. Constructing the estimates in this way meant that a range of baseline arrest
rates were generated.
Table I shows that the average baseline arrest rates ranged from 0.09 to 0.15 arrests
per day. This means that for the baseline period, on average, ofﬁcers who worked on the
operation made one arrest roughly once every seven to ten days. It is clear from the
results shown in Table I that the operation had a positive effect on the average ofﬁcer
arrest rate. In fact, the average arrest rate during the operation was roughly three to four
times higher than that for the baseline period. Expressed in a slightly different way,
whilst working on Operation Bream, ofﬁcers made arrests almost every other day
(compared to approximately once a week for the baseline period). A series of
related-samples t-tests conﬁrmed that the differences in arrest rates were statistically
signiﬁcant for comparisons that considered the high (t(84) ¼ 5.0, p , 0.00001,
two-tailed), medium (t(84) ¼ 4.65, p , 0.00001, two-tailed) and low estimates (t(84) ¼
4.04, p , 00001, two-tailed) of the baseline arrest rate.
Average daily arrest rate (Bream) Average daily arrest rate (Merseyside)
Baseline (low to high) Range 0.09 to 0.15 Range 0.05 to 0.10
Operation Bream 0.41 Range 0.06 to 0.10
Table I.
Average arrest rates for
Operation Bream and a
comparison period
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operating across the wider policing area, we also estimated the average arrest rates for
Merseyside police ofﬁcers that did not work on Operation Bream. The results of this
analysis, shown in Table I, suggest that there was no change in the average arrest rate
(derived by dividing the total number of arrests made during the relevant periods by an
estimate of the number of ofﬁcers who could potentially make arrests during this period)
across Merseyside. Thisdemonstratesthat theincrease in arrest ratesobserved forofﬁcers
who worked on Operation Bream was not simply commensurate with the general trend
observed elsewhere. This ﬁnding is important as it helps to rule out rival explanations of
the pattern observed. For instance, it is unlikely that the increase in arrest rates could be
explained in terms of a seasonal pattern or a general change in policing policy.
To express the ﬁndings in a slightly different way, a total of 90 arrests were made
during Operation Bream. Since ofﬁcer arrest rates were around three to ﬁve times
higher during the operation, using a simple calculation, it is possible to conclude that
had the ofﬁcers who worked on the operation worked the same number of days in their
usual way, they would have made between 15 and 30 arrests. Thus, the ofﬁcers who
worked on the initiative made up to 75 additional arrests than they would have done
had they completed their normal duties.
There are two potential interpretations of the increased arrest rate of ofﬁcers. The
rise in the volume of arrests indicates that there was deﬁnite evidence of a police
crackdown in operation. Seen in this light, the increased arrest rate can be viewed as an
indicator of effective implementation of the scheme. However, the increase in the actual
rate of the arrests also suggests a positive impact of the scheme, since there is no
reason to suggest that ofﬁcers who made arrests on the scheme would not have had the
opportunity to have made arrests during their normal duties. In these terms therefore,
the increase in the arrest rate is a positive outcome of the scheme. However, it is not a
ﬁnal outcome in terms of actual crime reduction. Rather, an increase in the arrest rate
should reduce the number of offenders available to commit crime; or demonstrate
heightened risks of being caught to other offenders. In this sense, therefore, the arrest
rate can be seen as an “intermediate outcome” (see also Weiss, 1998), as it leads to a
chain of events that should affect the ﬁnal outcome (a reduction in crime).
Calls for police service
Police calls for service records are a good indicator of public demand for police
intervention, and have previously been used as a measure of “formal social control”
(Bowers and Hirschﬁeld, 1999). To examine the effect of the initiative on calls for
service, data were collected for the whole of Merseyside for the period 1 April 2001 to
31 July 2002, thereby providing data which covered the 12 months that preceded the
scheme, the one month period during which the initiative was operational and the
subsequent two months. Data for the after period were limited to a period of two
months because further police operations were implemented along other bus routes in
the reference area after this period.
The geographical location of the action route, digitised using a GIS, is shown in
Figure 1. As the bus route was essentially a line on the map, a buffer zone, which
surrounded the action route, was generated to deﬁne the likely area over which the
initiative would have the most impact, and for reasons previously discussed a 200m
buffer zone was constructed. For this analysis, because Command and Control records
are only accurate to a resolution of 100m the buffer zone was made up of all 100m grid
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buffer zone which captured calls for service which occurred up to 200m from the action
route. The use of a larger buffer zone would increase the likelihood that any effects
generated would have been diluted or “washed out” (across a wider area), and hence
not detected. Conversely, the use of a buffer zone that was too small would increase the
likelihood of type I statistical error (rejecting the null hypothesis when it is in fact true)
because any patterns observed would simply be unreliable (for a further discussion of
these issues, see, for example, Bowers and Johnson, 2003; Hamilton-Smith, 2002).
To examine the effectiveness of the scheme, comparisons were made between the
action route and a reference area, in this case the remainder of Merseyside, for the
periods before, during and after the implementation of the initiative. The number of
calls for all types of incident for the action route and the remainder of Merseyside, were
standardised as a rate per 1,000 households. As an indicative measure, for the 12
months prior to Operation Bream, the rates for all command and control calls were
2,420 and 1,130 for the action route and the remainder of Merseyside respectively. This
indicates that demand for police services per household was over twice as high along
the action route than for the remainder of Merseyside. A simple analysis of the number
calls made for the before, during, and after periods of the operation (Figure 2),
demonstrates that for the reference area, there was a slight increase in the number of
calls made during the before and intervention periods. In contrast along the action
route there was a 22 per cent reduction in calls for the same period. For the subsequent
period (i.e. during-after) there were similar downward trends in the number of calls for
both the action route and reference area.
Thus,thepatternofresultsobservedwasclearlyselectivetherebysuggestingthatthe
reduction observed along the action route during the period of implementation could not
be explained in relation to a more general trend, but was attributable to the scheme.
However, the above results do not indicate whether the change observed along the
action route was statistically reliable or the result of a chance ﬂuctuation. Thus, it was
necessary to derive a standardized measure of effect size. To do this we used an
approach advocated by Farrington and Welsh (2002) which involves computing odds
ratios. This approach is particularly useful where the data available is limited to levels
Figure 2.
Calls for service per 1,000
households for action
route and reference area
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as was the case here.
An important reason for using odds ratios is that they allow the calculation of the
statistical signiﬁcance of the effect size observed. This is done by computing the
standard error of the odds ratio (see Lipsey and Wilson, 2001) and then calculating a
z-score. The statistical signiﬁcance of the resulting z-score is established by consulting
existing tables generated for the z distribution (as a rough guide, a value of 1.96 or
more is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 per cent level).
Fortunately, interpretation of an odds ratio is intuitive as they simply indicate the
proportional change in crime in an action area relative to that in a comparison area.
Thus, an odds ratio of 1.0 indicates a scenario where changes in calls for service in two
areas are simply commensurate. An odds ratio of greater than 1 reﬂects a desirable
outcome, whereby relative to the change observed in the reference area, there was a
reduction in the action area. In contrast, an odds ratio of less than 1 indicates an
undesirable effect, with the increase in calls for service in the action area exceeding that
in the reference area. The magnitude of change is also readily interpretable. For
instance, an odds ratio of 1.50 represents a situation where there was a 50 per cent
increase in the reference area relative to the action area (1.20, a 20 per cent increase, and
so on). Expressed in a slightly different way, an odds ratio of 1.50 represents a situation
where there was a reduction of 33 per cent (¼ 1   1=1:5) in the action area relative to
the reference area (1.20 a 17 per cent decrease, and so on).
Figure 3 is a “forest plot” which shows the odds ratio (and associated 95 per cent
conﬁdence limits) calculated for the change in calls for service in the action area
Figure 3.
Odds ratios for the (200m)
action area using the
remainder of Merseyside
as the reference area
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of 1. As noted above, an odds ratio of 1 indicates that the change in the action area was
simply in line with that observed in the comparison area. For odds ratios where the 95
per cent conﬁdence limits overlap the baseline odds ratio of 1, the change in the action
area was (statistically) non-signiﬁcant. Where they do not, the change was statistically
signiﬁcant. Thus, it is apparent that, relative to the remainder of Merseyside, during
the operation there was a signiﬁcant reduction in police calls for service
(odds ratio ¼ 1:25, z ¼ 10.17, p , .0001, two-tailed).
However, it is unlikely that the increased police presence from the operation would
impact on all types of calls for service. For example, certain types of offences such as
domestic disputes occur mainly indoors, and other calls for service are administrative
or orientated towards public assistance. Consequently, it is unlikely that the operation
would affect these call types. Thus, in addition to examining “all calls for service” a
separate analysis was conducted for calls for service that were concerned with
disorder alone, a type of call for service that police presence on the route should
logically impact upon. The disorder category included serious disorder; incidents on
licensed premises; minor disorder; drunkenness; disturbance involving juveniles; and
disturbance on a public service vehicle. It was hypothesised that the operation would
have a particular effect on these types of disorder, as police presence could plausibly
discourage them. The results indicated a signiﬁcant reduction in calls of this type
(odds ratio ¼ 1:13, z ¼ 2.2, p , 0.05, two-tailed), thereby validating our prediction.
Considering the two-month period that followed the termination of the operation,
relative to the period before, the odds ratio for all calls for service was 1.21 (z ¼ 10.15,
p , .0001, two-tailed) suggesting that the overall effect of the scheme may have been
sustained, at least for this period. In contrast, for disorder alone, the odds ratio was 0.97
(z ¼ 20.78, p ¼ ns, two-tailed), indicating that after the termination of the operation,
the demand for police services relating to incidents of disorder returned to its
pre-operation level. This suggests that during the operation there was a signiﬁcant
effect of the scheme, with their being a general reduction in the number of calls for
police services. However, following the termination of the operation, there was some
evidence of a sustained effect, but this was selective and calls for service regarding
disorder resumed to their pre-operation levels.
Recorded crime
To see if the operation had an impact on recorded crime, disaggregate level data were
obtained for the county of Merseyside for the types of crime which, theoretically, were
most likely to be affected by the operation. These were burglary, criminal damage,
theft from vehicle, theft of vehicle, assault, robbery, theft, and fraud. To allow us to
examine both the effectiveness of the scheme during implementation, and to see if any
effects extended beyond this period in the absence of further implementation, the data
acquired covered the periods before, during, and after the implementation of the
scheme. The data obtained included a grid reference accurate to within one-metre, and
a date and time ﬁeld. Consequently, using a GIS it was possible to produce maps which
showed precisely when and where each crime occurred.
As with the analysis of calls for service, a 200m buffer zone that surrounded the
action route was generated. In addition, further buffer zones were generated for the
action route to allow us to examine the distance over which the scheme had an impact.
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ﬁrst, which represented the action route was simply a 200m buffer zone. The second
type was a series of overlapping buffer zones that had the same morphology as the ﬁrst
but extended from it at intervals of 100m. For example, the ﬁrst of these buffer zones
extends between 100 and 300m away from the route; the second between 200 and 400m
and so on (see Figure 1).
To examine the effect of the operation on levels of recorded crime we used the odds
ratio approach discussed above. In the ﬁrst instance, we computed odds ratios for the
central (200m) action route. The rationale for doing so was that because the
intervention was concentrated within this area it was reasonable to assume that should
the scheme have any crime reductive effects they would be most apparent within this
area. A number of patterns are evident from the results presented in Figure 3. First,
considering all recorded crime, relative to the remainder of Merseyside, there was a
small reduction along the action route. However, this was not statistically signiﬁcant
(z ¼ 1.03, p ¼ ns, two-tailed). Second, with the exception of the crimes theft from
vehicle and burglary non-dwelling, reductions were observed for each type of crime.
Third, whilst the reductions were fairly substantial for a number of crimes, the only
changes that reached statistical signiﬁcance were for the crimes of assault (z ¼ 2.22,
p , 0.05, two-tailed) and theft from vehicle (z ¼ 2.13, p , 0.05, two-tailed). Thus, the
operation appeared to have had an effect on recorded crime but this was limited to two
types of crime. Importantly, the ﬁnding that the only changes that were statistically
reliable were for the crimes for which there was evidence of a reduction suggests that
there was no evidence of crime switch displacement.
To examine whether or not there was evidence of residual deterrence, we also
computed odds ratios for the period that followed the termination of the scheme. For
this analysis, the levels of crime along the bus route (and the reference area) before and
after (rather than during) were compared. For obvious reasons this analysis was
restricted to those crimes for which there was evidence of a statistically signiﬁcant
reduction during the implementation of the scheme. For the crime assault, it was
apparent that following the termination of the operation, the level of crime along the
route resumed to its pre-operation level (odds ratio ¼ 1:02, z ¼ 0.13, p ¼ ns,
two-tailed). The same pattern was also apparent for the crime theft from vehicle
(odds ratio ¼ 0:93, z ¼ 0.55, p ¼ ns, two-tailed). Thus, whilst it would appear that the
operation had a signiﬁcant effect on these types of crime during implementation, after
the scheme ﬁnished the level of crime returned to its pre-operation level.
Considering the distance over which the scheme had an impact, for the crimes for
which there was evidence of a reduction within the 200m buffer zone, we computed
odds ratios for the adjacent buffer zones. As noted above, the additional 200m buffer
zones overlapped each other. The reason for adopting this approach was to increase the
sensitivity of the analyses, whilst using buffer zones that were sufﬁciently large
enough to minimise the likelihood of type I statistical error.
Thus, we computed odds-ratios for buffer zones that extended 0-200m, 100-300m,
200-400m, 300-500m from the bus route. The results for the crime assault are shown in
Figure 4. For this crime, the pattern of results apparent for the ﬁrst three buffer zones
suggest that the crime reductive effects of the scheme extended up to 400m from the
bus route. Within the 300-500m buffer zone, the reduction observed was not
statistically reliable, and hence it is likely that the effect of the scheme did not extend
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For comparison purposes, odds ratios were also calculated for the other types of crime
for each of the buffer zones. The results showed no systematic patterns, demonstrating
that the results observed for assault and theft from car were unique and therefore likely
to be attributable to the scheme.
Discussion and conclusions
In this paper we have used a range of data sets and analytical techniques to examine
the effectiveness of a public transport initiative in reducing crime. The operation used a
multi-agency partnership that policed a relatively high crime bus route intensively for
a period of four weeks. Intended as a pilot scheme, the operation incorporated a number
of initiatives including the use of a multi-agency Safer Transport Team and the use of
state of the art CCTV equipment. The research has raised a number of conceptual
issues as well as testing a series of hypotheses, which will now be discussed in turn.
During the operation a total of 90 arrests were made during the four-week period of
operation. For the ofﬁcers who worked on Bream, their arrest rate increased by a factor
of three-ﬁve times relative to their past performance. It is suggested that the increase in
arrest rates was one of the most signiﬁcant factors in the success of Operation Bream.
Considering the theoretical mechanisms of change discussed in relation to the
operation in the introduction, this ﬁnding also provides evidence to support claims that
there was a causal link between the interventions and the reduction in levels of crime
and disorder observed along the bus route. Speciﬁcally, this ﬁnding suggests that by
increasing ofﬁcer arrest rates as well as the visibility of policing along the route, the
operation had a deterrent effect.
Considering the changes in crime and disorder in more detail, it was apparent that
the demand for police service, as measured by changes in the number of calls to the
police and speciﬁcally for calls relating to disorder only, decreased during the
operation. Similarly, reductions were apparent for most types of crime, although these
changes were only statistically reliable for two types of crime, assault and theft from
car. Where there was evidence of an increase in a particular type of crime this was
Figure 4.
Odds ratio for assault for a
series of buffer zones,
using the rest of
Merseyside as a
reference area
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cause crime switch displacement. Finally, with the exception of the number of calls for
police service, levels of crime and disorder returned to their pre-operation levels
following the termination of the scheme, indicating that the scheme did not have a
residual deterrence effect.
In relation to geographical displacement, unlike most crime prevention initiatives
there was no clearly delineated operational boundary for the scheme, as police ofﬁcers
could have patrolled a number of areas around the bus route, and the geographical
coverage of the other interventions may have extended beyond the immediate
boundary of the route. Data regarding these factors were unavailable here, and hence
the possibility exists that any changes observed for areas near to, but not along the bus
route, may have occurred as a direct result of the scheme, rather than as a side effect.
As a result, rather than conceptualising changes around the route speciﬁcally in terms
of displacement or diffusion of beneﬁt, we elected to examine the distance over which
the scheme could plausibly have had an impact, be it positive or negative. It was
evident that for assault and theft from car, the two crimes for which there was evidence
of a reliable reduction along the bus route, statistically reliable reductions were
apparent across a series of buffer zones that extended up to 400m from the bus route. In
the subsequent buffer zone, the change observed was not reliable in statistical terms.
Thus, it is likely that the scheme was successful at reducing some types of crime up to
400m from the bus route. The question of whether the reductions observed beyond the
immediate buffer zone (200m) of the bus route were a direct result of the scheme or at
least partly attributable to a diffusion of beneﬁt remains an interesting question that
may be addressed by future research. To do this, it would be necessary to collect data
on police ofﬁcer patrolling patterns and the precise range over which each of the
interventions could plausibly have an impact.
Taken together, the above ﬁndings suggest that the operation was effective in
reducing crime and disorder along the action route. Further to this, anecdotal evidence
generated from informal questionnaires of both the public and staff involved in the
operation suggested that the operation was well received. Hence, a further avenue for
future research would be to explore staff and passenger perceptions of the operation in
more detail and to examine the effect of similar operations on people’s fear of crime
using before and after surveys.
The authors suggest that similar multi-agency police operations could be
undertaken elsewhere with positive results. On Merseyside for example, although the
action route experienced relatively high levels of bus recorded crime, 19 routes with
higher levels of crime could be identiﬁed from MASS security records. As noted above,
problems exist in identifying the nature and extent of crime on buses, and hence it is
recommended that thought should be given to the recording systems used to capture
information concerning crime and disorder on buses. This would allow a more precise
matching of the problems faced on different bus routes and the interventions that
might be implemented to ameliorate them. Clearly, future research should also aim to
explore whether interventions aimed at reducing crime and disorder on public
transport are more effective in different types of area and environments, and, if so,
what the composition of such areas are.
The results in Figure 3 suggest that, in general, the operation had a greater impact
on personal and violent crimes as opposed to traditional property crime (although only
a minority of the reductions were signiﬁcant). Thus, the authors recommend that in
PIJPSM
27,3
316future different variants of the initiative should be implemented to see if they have
differential effects on crime and types of crime. For instance the use of plain clothed
rather than uniformed ofﬁcers might lead to an increase in arrests for different types of
crime. For this reason, during the planning phase of future initiatives, thought should
be given to the types of crime to be targeted for reduction and the theoretical rationale
underlying the approach(es) considered.
Where similar operations are implemented in the future, thought also should be
given to the timing of implementation. To increase the impact of the scheme, seasonal
trends in patterns of crime and disorder should be considered to ensure that routes
with appropriately high rates of crime are targeted at the right times. The time of day
that particular interventions are implemented may also be important. In the current
research, for example, there was someevidence that more arrestswere made during the
late afternoon and evening police shifts. There was also evidence that the initiative was
more successful during the ﬁrst two weeks of implementation. Thus, it may be wise to
implement similar initiatives as short-run intensive operations (possibly seven-14 days
at a time), and alternate implementation across a series of different bus routes.
Disinformation and publicity strategies may also be used to enhance the effectiveness
of schemes where such an approach is adopted (see Smith et al., 2002; Johnson and
Bowers, 2003).
The current research demonstrates a number of methods that can be used in the
evaluation of crime prevention measures aimed at reducing crime on public transport
routes. The results suggest that the scheme was successful in increasing ofﬁcer arrest
rates and reducing crime and disorder along the action route. An important concept
discussed above relates to the area over which such operations are likely to have an
impact, and how there effectiveness may consequently be measured. In the analyses
presented, as a starting point we deﬁned the action area as a 200m buffer zone that
surrounded the bus route. However, it is reasonable to suggest that the area over which
the scheme may have an effect could vary at different points along the route. Reasons
for suggesting this include the inﬂuence of factors that may affect police ofﬁcer’s
visibility, in terms of how far from the vehicle they can see at different points along the
route, or alternatively how far police ofﬁcers patrol either side of the bus route. Thus,
where differences exist, how does one distinguish between changes that occur as a side
effect of the scheme (displacement or a diffusion of beneﬁt) or that are directly
attributable to the scheme itself?
In this paper, we have presented a number of suggestions for future research, but
particularly important questions concern when and where such schemes are successful
and whether they impact upon passengers (and employees) fear of crime as well as levels
of crime and disorder. In addition to examining the effectiveness of such schemes on
levelsofcrimeanddisorder,futureresearchmayalsoconsidertheprocessthroughwhich
the interventions are delivered and how cost beneﬁcial these types of intervention are.
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